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Outlook and Appraisal 
Growth in the British economy came almost 
to a hal t during the f i r s t half of th i s 
year . As a r e s u l t , even a speedy 
resolution of the coal dispute would be 
unlikely to push the GDP growth rate this 
year above 2.5%. Though much of July's 
in te res t ra te increase has already been 
reversed, i t i s l ike ly to prove more 
d i f f i cu l t to reverse the effects on the 
r e t a i l price index and thus a t t a in the 
goal of H.5% inf la t ion a t the end of the 
year. The uncompetitive nature of the 
housing finance market makes a speedy and 
fu l l unwinding of the recent r i s e in 
mortgage rates unlikely. 
The reasons for the slowdown in growth are 
not difficult to identify. Maintenance of 
steady growth was dependent on exports and 
fixed investment compensating for the 
slowdown in consumers' expenditure and on 
t h e r e being no r e t u r n to destocking. 
Fixed investment has played i t s part, and 
i s l ike ly to continue to do so under the 
stimulus of the Budget changes in capital 
allowances. Exports, however, showed 
l i t t l e growth during the f i r s t half of the 
year. Net oil exports in particular were 
markedly lower. The stagnant volume of 
exports was coupled with continued growth 
in imports, and there was a further bout 
of destocking. 
Employment, always a lagging indicator of 
economic trends, continued to increase in 
the year to March. However, the bulk of 
the jobs created were part- t ime and for 
females. Correcting the official figures 
to allow for the preponderance of par t -
time jobs greatly reduces the scale of job 
creation over the l a s t year. Trends in 
n o t i f i e d vacancies and numbers of 
registered unemployed are consistent with 
continued slow growth of employment over 
the summer months. The r ev iva l in 
employment has induced discouraged workers 
to re-enter the labour market and partly 
accounts for the present conjunction of 
simultaneously r i s ing employment and 
unemployment. 
There i s a dearth of information on trends 
in the Scott ish economy during the f i r s t 
half of t h i s year. I t would appear that 
indus t r ia l output grew reasonably rapidly 
du r ing t h e f i r s t q u a r t e r , but may 
subsequently have s tagnated during the 
second. The resu l t s of the April and July 
CBI Surveys are consistent with t h i s view. 
Prospects for the third quarter are not 
bright given the continuation of the coal 
dispute. The Scottish growth rate for the 
year as a whole is unlikely to be as high as 
anticipated in the May Commentary. 
The May assessment t h a t the immediate 
outlook for the Scottish economy was "better 
than a t any t ime s ince 1979" i s s t i l l 
appropriate. I t i s important, however, to 
be quite clear about the meaning of t h i s 
assessment. While i t implies that the growth 
ra te of the Scottish economy th i s year i s 
l ikely to be higher than at any time since 
the onset of recession, i t does not exclude 
the possibility that growth will be somewhat 
slower than forecast in May. 
Recovery in the Scottish economy began late 
in 1983 and continued into early 1984. I t is 
possible that growth in the indus t r ia l 
sec to r then slowed during the second 
quarter. However, since i t would appear 
that the level of output during the f i r s t 
quarter was markedly above the average for 
1983, even maintenance of the f i r s t quarter 
level for the remainder of 1984 would lead 
to a growth ra te for the year of about 2%. 
A return to growth during the fourth quarter 
would s t i l l leave the annual rate somewhat 
below the 2.5% a n t i c i p a t e d in the May 
Commentary. 
The coal dispute continues to cast a long 
shadow over both the Bri t ish and Scottish 
economies and is partly responsible for the 
unexpectedly poor performance of both during 
the f i r s t half of th i s year. The dispute 
has d i r e c t l y depressed the l e v e l of 
industrial output, with particular emphasis 
on the index for energy and water supply 
industries, but with spillover effects into 
o t h e r s e c t o r s , such as m e t a l 
manufacturing, transport and distribution. 
The more serious and long-run effects of 
the dispute are the indirect ones. These 
are mu l t i f ace t ed . The shor t term 
inf la t ion outlook has deteriorated with 
r i s e s in mortgage r a t e s , f a l l s in 
s t e r l ing ' s effective exchange r a t e and 
prospective increases in energy costs 
required to cover both the greater use of 
o i l in e l e c t r i c i t y generation and the 
increased def ic i t of the National Coal 
Board. 
The Government's monetary and f i sca l 
strategy have been knocked off course by 
the direct Exchequer costs of the dispute, 
with adverse consequences for the PSBR. 
While the f i n a l e f f e c t s on o f f i c i a l 
borrowing may not be s i g n i f i c a n t , 
f inancial markets have been sufficiently 
u n s e t t l e d t o r e v e r s e , a t l e a s t 
t empora r i l y , the downward t rend in 
interest ra tes . 
Though the long-run effects of the dispute 
on both the inf la t ion ra te and the PSBR 
are unlikely to be s ignif icant , what i s 
p o t e n t i a l l y damaging to both t he 
government's strategy and the prospects 
for sus ta ined recovery i s t h a t any 
perceived acceleration of price inflation 
makes i t i nc r ea s ing ly d i f f i c u l t to 
maintain downward p ressu re on wage 
inflation. A strong case can be made that 
maintaining, and indeed increasing, such 
pressure offers the greatest prospect of 
any sustained reduction in unemployment. 
A reduction of wage inf la t ion has become 
increasingly important with the marked 
slowdown in the economy. 
There i s an accumulat ing amount of 
evidence that employment i s sensitive to 
movements in real wages. The case for 
reducing, or indeed hal t ing, the ra te of 
growth of real wages cannot be dismissed 
by arguing that i t has the undesirable 
effect of depressing domestic demand. 
Domestic demand i s a function both of 
numbers employed and of the wage rate. I t 
i s quite possible that an increase in the 
former would more than compensate a fal l 
in the lat ter . 
Even if i t did not, aggregate demand 
comprises not merely domestic demand, but 
also export demand. While there i s a 
l imit to the extent to which domestic demand 
can sustain Br i t i sh based industry, export 
demand i s p o t e n t i a l l y i n s a t i a b l e . In 
a d d i t i o n , the employment m u l t i p l i e r 
associated with export demand i s greater 
than that associated with domestic demand, 
since a much larger proportion of the la t ter 
leaks into imports. 
I t is within this context that the issue of 
a statutory national minimum wage should be 
deba ted a t t h e TUC Congress . The 
introduction of such a measure would be 
likely to further increase unemployment. No 
convincing empirical evidence ex i s t s to 
substant ia te the claim that a statutory 
minimum wage creates jobs. On the contrary 
a wealth of evidence suggests tha t such a 
policy reduces the employment of those whom 
i t i s intended to help. I t s adverse effects 
are focussed on the young, the unskil led, 
and rac ia l minor i t ies , in short on those 
groups whose employment prospects have 
deteriorated most during the recession. 
The outcome of the TUC debate on minimum 
wages is most unlikely to have any effect on 
the pol ic ies of the present government. 
This i s fortunate, since introduction of a 
minimum wage i s an irrelevance a t the 
present time. I t i s regre t tab le that the 
TUC does not press with equal fervour for 
the introduction of measures which are 
likely to create employment, and which are 
not i n c o n s i s t e n t with the Government's 
market-oriented rhe to r i c or i t s f i s c a l 
stance. Such measures do ex i s t , the most 
obvious being a marginal employment subsidy. 
This proposal has hitherto been rejected by 
the Dept. of Employment on the grounds that 
i t would d i s t o r t employers ' na tu r a l 
p re ferences and induce them to h i r e 
employees whom they would otherwise not have 
done. A similar objection could be lodged 
against exis t ing indus t r ia l incentives, 
against the Young Worker Scheme, against the 
Micro-Electronics Application Programme, in 
fact against practically all expenditure and 
taxation measures. All are designed to 
a l t e r p a t t e r n s of behaviour. So i s a 
marginal wage subsidy. Since the government 
believes that wage moderation is the key to 
reducing unemployment, and since wages 
adjust only slowly of their own accord, the 
logic of the government's own position 
d ic ta tes measures to reduce the costs of 
labour. The most obvious such measure is a 
marginal employment subsidy. 
August 20th 1984 
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The World Economy 
The year to date has seen a marked 
broadening of the geographic base of the 
recovery which now embraces not just North 
America, but most of the wider OECD area 
as well. The generalised expansion in the 
deve loped world has in t u r n been 
transmitted to developing countries as 
demand for commodi t i e s and s e m i -
manufactures has increased. The volume of 
world t rade, which increased by only 2% 
during 1983, i s l ikely to increase by 5% 
during the current year. The stimulus 
provided by consumers' expenditure and the 
inventory cycle in the early stages of the 
upturn is increasingly being supplemented 
by export demand. The gathering pace of 
recovery has wrought a turnaround in the 
finances of the corporate sector, which in 
turn has contributed to a revival of 
private fixed investment. 
Though the recovery outside the US has 
been slow by h i s to r i ca l standards, the 
coming twelve months are l ike ly to see a 
g r ea t e r degree of convergence in the 
economic experience of the major countries. 
Growth in the US i s expected to slow 
markedly in the l a t t e r half of th i s year 
while that in the remainder of the OECD 
should accelerate. 
The strength and l ikely duration of the 
upturn are overshadowed by several factors. 
Firstly, high real interest rates, in large 
part a consequence of expansive American 
f i sca l policy, threaten the s t a b i l i t y of 
the i n t e r n a t i o n a l f i n a n c i a l sy s t em. 
Secondly, pers i s ten t ly high real rates may 
shortcircuit the investment recovery already 
under way by channelling corporate profits 
into the liquidation of debt rather than the 
expansion of capacity. Thirdly, though the 
immediate threa t to o i l supplies posed by 
t h e I r a n - I r a q war a p p e a r s t o have 
diminished, world o i l markets remain in a 
state of flux. 
Medium term prospects for oil price remain 
more than usually uncertain, with l i t t l e 
firm information on the volume of OPEC 
output. This uncertainty was superimposed 
on financial markets already unsettled by 
the US budget de f ic i t and contributed to a 
period of cons ide rab le i n s t a b i l i t y on 
f o r e i g n exchange m a r k e t s in J u l y , 
culminating in a further upward ratchet of 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l i n t e r e s t r a t e s . While 
i n f l a t i o n shows l i t t l e sign of again 
becoming a major in ternat ional problem in 
the immediate future, unemployment shows 
every sign of remaining one for at least the 
dura t ion of t h i s decade de sp i t e some 
evidence that recent quarters may have 
witnessed a moderate increase in employment. 
OUTPUT 
Notwithstanding the broader geographic base 
of t h e r e c o v e r y , g r o w t h in t h e 
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i n d u s t r i a l i s e d world continues to be 
dominated by the pace of expansion in the 
US. Revised data for the second quarter 
suggest that the pace of expansion there 
was only margina l ly slower than the 
exceptionally high 9% rate recorded during 
the f i r s t . The d o l l a r and American 
nominal interest rates accordingly rose to 
new record l e v e l s as corpora te and 
personal credit demands were superimposed 
on the already large s t ruc tura l budget 
deficit . 
Rising in te res t ra tes should bring some 
slackening of the pace of US growth during 
the remainder of this year with growth on 
a fourth quarter to fourth quarter basis 
likely to be of the order of 6.51. Though 
similar expectations of some slowdown in 
the US economy have been frequently voiced 
in the past, the recent f a l l in the index 
of US leading indicators suggests tha t a 
deceleration i s now imminent. For the 
OECD area as a whole growth from fourth 
quarter to fourth quarter i s l ike ly to 
amount to 4%, marginally faster than 
expected some months ago. In particular, 
growth rates have been revised upwards in 
Germany and Japan, and marginal ly 
downwards in the UK and France. 
much more modest a t jus t under 3.5%. The 
figures for manufacturing are marginally 
higher than those for industry as a whole. 
The changing character of the recovery 
re f l ec t s i t s broader geographic spread. 
With the exception of the US economy, the 
trade balance and private investment have 
now assumed the stimulatory role fulfilled 
in the ea r ly s t ages of the upturn by 
consumers' expenditure. The US trade deficit 
has i t s partial counterpart in the surpluses 
of Germany and Japan, where as a resul t 
domestic demand i s now expanding. Rapid 
productivity growth has t ranslated into 
s t rong corpora te balance s h e e t s . The 
ava i l ab i l i ty of in ternal finance and the 
s table inf la t ion outlook have induced a 
recovery in business investment and, to a 
l esser extent, in stockbuilding. However, 
the persistent upward trend in real interest 
r a tes threatens the investment revival, as 
debt retirement becomes an increasingly 
a t t r ac t i ve a l t e rna t ive use of corporate 
funds. 
LABOUR MARKETS 
120 
80 
Indus t r i a l Production 1980 - 100 
(seas , a d j . ) 
...Japan 
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 
Industr ia l production in the OECD area 
increased by 8.4% in the year to April. 
The bulk of t h i s increase was accounted 
for by the US and Canada where industrial 
output rose by almost 13% during the 
twelve month period. For OECD Europe and 
the EEC the annual ra te of increase was 
The rapid pace of expansion notwithstanding, 
unemployment in OECD Europe continues to 
increase and now exceeds 11% on the OECD's 
standardised measure. Amongst member 
countries only the US, Sweden, Australia and 
Aus t r i a have experienced a sus ta ined 
downward trend. The American experience, 
where the standardised unemployment rate i s 
l e ss than 8% and fa l l ing , re f lec t s the 
conjunction of rising employment, up by 3.9% 
in the year to the f i r s t quarter of 1984, 
and a sharp slowdown in labour force growth. 
Employment in the US has increased in l ine 
with output to a much greater extent than in 
most other OECD economies. The more 
favourable US employment experience reflects 
in pa r t a cons iderab ly lower r a t e of 
increase of rea l wages since 1973 and more 
marked changes in the re la t ive price of 
energy than have occurred in the OECD as a 
whole. Both of these factors have tended to 
encourage g r e a t e r use of l abour , and 
par t icular ly of unskilled labour, in the 
production process. 
While some other member s t a t e s , such as 
Canada, Britain and the larger Scandinavian 
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c o u n t r i e s have recorded increases in 
employment in recent quarters, these have 
been insufficient to absorb natural growth 
in the labour force, with the result that 
employment and unemployment have increased 
in tandem over the pas t year . OECD 
f o r e c a s t s suggest t h a t a l l European 
countries with the exception of France, 
Belgium and Greece a r e l i k e l y to 
experience increases in employment over 
the coming twelve months. In general 
however, the increases are unlikely to 
ar res t the upward trend of unemployment 
except in the UK, Germany and Scandinavia. 
point reached in mid-1983, there i s l i t t l e 
sign of any sustained acceleration. Indeed 
in several cases, for example, Germany, 
France and I t a l y , modest d e c e l e r a t i o n 
continues. Major in ternat ional inf la t ion 
d i f fe ren t i a l s s t i l l ex i s t however with 
inf la t ion in OECD Europe markedly higher 
than in the OECD area as a whole. The 
average annual OECD inf la t ion ra te of 5.4% 
in May subsumes a European rate of 8.7%, and 
an EEC ra te of 7%. Within the EEC i t s e l f , 
national rates of inflation range from 2% in 
Germany and 4.5% in the UK to 7.5%, 11% and 
17% in F r a n c e , I t a l y and G r e e c e , 
respectively. 
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In those countries where an increase in 
employment has been recorded, there i s no 
obvious uniform sectoral pattern. In the 
Bri t ish case the increase has occurred 
almost entirely in the service sector with 
manufacturing employment at best only 
s tab i l i s ing in recent months. In the US 
the increase in employment has been more 
broadly based with approximately two jobs 
being created in industry for every five 
created in services. Whereas the net 
increase in employment recorded in the US 
occurred primarily amongst males, with a 
male-female r a t i o of 3:2, growth in 
employment in B r i t a i n has occurred 
ent i re ly amongst females, with a heavy 
bias towards part-time employment. This 
bias has also been apparent in other EEC 
countries. 
While r e t a i l p r i ce i n f l a t i o n a t the 
aggregate OECD level shows l i t t l e sign of 
acceleration, the extent of any deceleration 
over the coming year is problematic. On the 
one hand latent inflationary pressures s t i l l 
ex i s t , while on the other, the continuing 
weakness of dollar-denominated o i l and 
commodity p r i c e s a c t s t o res t ra in any 
acceleration of inf la t ion. Amongst the 
l a t en t pressures i s the level of capacity 
util isation in many member states which is 
now at or approaching previous cycl ical 
peaks. Despite widespread unemployment and 
accumulating evidence that downward wage 
flexibility creates jobs, organised labour 
is increasingly seeking compensation for the 
"sacrifices" of the recession years. 
INFLATION 
Though the annual r a t e of in f la t ion in the 
OECD area i s now about 1% above the low 
The upward s p i r a l of the dol lar has acted to 
dampen inf la t ionary pressures in the US, but 
has had the oppos i te e f fec t in those 
countries whose currencies have weakened. 
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For such countries the strong dollar and 
the associated trend of internat ional 
interest rates have both increased import 
p r i c e s of d o l l a r - denominated raw 
m a t e r i a l s and r a i s e d t h e c o s t of 
borrowing. Both feed indirect ly into 
producer pr ices , with the l a t t e r also 
directly affecting consumer prices through 
mortgage r a t e s . In the face of a 
recovery in the demand for labour the wage 
moderation of the last few years may prove 
d i f f i c u l t to su s t a i n now t h a t the 
decelerating phase of inf lat ion i s a t an 
end. 
PROGNOSIS 
On a global basis, the pace of growth this 
year i s markedly f a s t e r than t ha t 
experienced in 1983. For the OECD as a 
whole, GNP i s l ike ly to expand by H% 
compared to l e s s than 2.5% las t year. As 
the year advances growth should decelerate 
in the US and accelerate elsewhere. 1985 
is expected to see a continuation of this 
pattern but with growth both in the US and 
elsewhere somewhat slower than in 1984. 
The maintenance of a generalised recovery 
i s crucia l ly dependent on a reversal of 
the p e r s i s t e n t upward t rend of r ea l 
i n t e re s t r a t es . Failure to tackle the 
underlying US s t ructura l budget de f ic i t 
has been the prime cause of r i s i n g 
American and international interest rates. 
3; 
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The inevi table measures to tackle the US 
de f i c i t must i n i t i a l l y slow the pace of 
growth in the US economy with consequent 
repercussions on the exports of America's 
trading partners. Amongst these partners 
are many debt-ridden developing countries. 
While dollar depreciation would reduce their 
debt burden, the associated slowdown of US 
import demand would simultaneously reduce 
the i r foreign exchange earnings used to 
s e r v i c e o u t s t a n d i n g d e b t . D o l l a r 
depreciation would also depress in ternal 
demand in developing countries by reducing 
the domestic currency proceeds of earnings 
from commodity exports. I t i s not clear 
therefore that a reduction in interest rates 
wrought by a reduction of the US budget 
deficit would in i t ia l ly remove the threat to 
the stabili ty of the international financial 
system posed by Third World indebtedness. 
In the event of a successful program to 
reduce the US budget deficit and subsequent 
dep rec i a t i on of the d o l l a r , America's 
industrialised trading partners would also 
face a slowdown in export demand. This would 
r e su l t both from a slowing of the pace of 
expansion in the US and an improvement in 
the competitiveness of US producers. 
In the short run therefore measures to 
tackle the US budget def ic i t must slow the 
pace of global expansion. Such a slowdown 
i s the converse of the stimulus which the 
de f i c i t has provided to the world economy 
over the past three years. Given the depth 
of the 1979-81 recession, a fiscal stimulus 
was required, but not on the scale and 
dura t ion of t h a t adminis te red by the 
American Administration. The US deficit was 
instrumental in pulling the world economy 
out of recession, but now threatens, through 
i t s e f f e c t s on foreign exchange and 
financial markets, the durabi l i ty of the 
recovery. 
Though the short run effects of remedial 
action in the US must slow the pace of 
global expansion, in the longer run 
elimination of the s t ructura l component of 
the def ic i t would provide a foundation for 
sustained expansion of the world economy 
over the remainder of this decade. I t would 
a t the same time help to defuse the l a t en t 
threat to the stabili ty of the international 
trade and financial systems posed by the 
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present level of global real in te res t 
r a t es . That in turn would offer some 
prospect of making s ignif icant inroads 
into present l eve l s of unemployment, 
prospects which on present pol ic ies are 
acknowledged to be almost non-existent. 
The longer the US author i t ies delay in 
introducing discret ionary measures to 
tackle the de f i c i t , the more l ike ly that 
such measures wi l l be forced on them by 
events themselves. The present scale of 
the twin US trade and budget de f i c i t s i s 
not sustainable indefinitely. The budget 
d e f i c i t mani fes t s i t s e l f in r i s i n g 
in te res t r a t es . Even though in te res t 
payments in the US are tax-deductible to a 
g r e a t e r ex tent than in most o ther 
countries, such provisions can only reduce 
and not eliminate the effects on debtors 
when rates are rising. Rising US interest 
ra tes must therefore eventually cause a 
slowdown in domestic demand. 
Such a slowdown would reduce the trade 
de f i c i t , but increase the budget de f ic i t 
as t a x r e v e n u e s f e l l below t h e 
Administration's opt imis t ic forecasts . 
The financing of an even larger de f ic i t 
would add to the upward p ressu re on 
interest rates, in turn further depressing 
both US domestic demand and tax revenues. 
Long-postponed measures to tackle the 
deficit would then become essential, but 
would coincide with and deepen an existing 
cycl ical downturn. Far bet ter to take 
such measures in the near future, when the 
economy i s in a strongly expansionary 
phase and when the i r effect would be 
contra-cycl ical , than have them act pro-
cyclically during a period of slowdown. 
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unemployment close to present levels into 
1985. 
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MACROECONOMIC TRENDS 
Growth in the British economy came almost 
to a hal t during the f i r s t half of 1984. 
The output measure of GDP, usua l ly 
considered the most r e l i a b l e , was 
pract ica l ly unchanged during the f i r s t 
three months of the year, with preliminary 
estimates pointing to a fal l of about 0.5% 
during the second quarter. I t is unlikely 
that the annual growth rate wi l l reach 
2.5? t h i s year . Of f i c i a l end year 
inflation targets are also unlikely to be 
achieved. Employment should continue to 
increase, but l e ss rapidly than in 1983. 
The slower pace of employment growth, 
coupled with the overhang of unregistered 
j o b l e s s , w i l l mainta in r e g i s t e r e d 
Stagnation in the f i r s t quarter primarily 
reflected a contraction in the volume of 
consumers' expenditure and a renewed bout of 
des tocking. The f a l l in consumption 
reflected a marked decline in real personal 
disposable income from the unexpectedly high 
level of the fourth quarter of last year and 
the maintenance into the f i r s t quarter of 
the higher savings ratio recorded since the 
middle of 1983. Two factors peculiar to the 
f i r s t quarter also acted to depress the 
level of consumers' expenditure: the l a t e 
occurrence of Easter and a heavy take-up of 
new l ife assurance policies in anticipation 
of Budget measures to abolish tax relief on 
l i f e premia. The contraction in consumers' 
expenditure and the return to destocking 
more than o f f s e t i nc reases in fixed 
investment and exports and a marginal fall 
in imports. 
Preliminary est imates suggest that the 
output measure of GDP fe l l by about 0.5% 
during the second quarter. Though consumers' 
expenditure again resumed i t s upward path, 
destocking continued and there was l i t t l e 
g rowth in e i t h e r e x p o r t s or f i xed 
investment. Government expenditure did 
however increase rapidly and during the 
first four months of the financial year 
was 7.5% higher than the corresponding 
period last year. Since the planned 
increase in government spending in 1984/5 
is only 5.75%, some slowdown in this 
component of demand is implied in later 
quarters if targets are to be met. 
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The general level of output during the 
second quarter was depressed by industrial 
unres t with the index of production 
falling by 3% compared to the f i r s t three 
months of t h i s year . As a r e s u l t 
indus t r ia l output in the second quarter 
was l i t t l e changed from that of a year 
ago. The principal cause of the poor 
second quarter industrial performance was 
a quar ter- to-quarter drop of 8% in the 
index for energy and water supply 
industr ies . The narrower manufacturing 
output index, which does not include these 
par t icular indus t r ies , has not been as 
dramatically affected by the coal dispute. 
Manufacturing output during the second 
quarter, though marginally down on the 
f i r s t , was s t i l l 2.5% higher than the 
corresponding quarter l a s t year. Even 
th i s figure i s misleading as i t r e f lec t s 
strong output growth in the third, and to 
a lesser extent fourth, quarters of 1983, 
since when the volume of manufacturing 
output has been on a downward trend. 
Consumers' expendi ture resumed i t s 
interupted upward trend during the second 
quarter, r is ing by 2% from i t s depressed 
f i r s t quarter level . Even though the 
volume of r e t a i l sales in the second 
quarter was the highest ever recorded, 
sales during the f i r s t half of the year 
were only 0.7% above those of the l a t t e r 
half of 1983. Since the turn of the year 
the CBI-FT survey of distributive trades has 
recorded a succession of months where sales 
expectations have not been fu l f i l l ed . The 
monthly pattern of retai l sales has become 
quite e r r a t i c , with a further dip recorded 
in July. The miners' dispute, through i t s 
effects on the disposable income of those 
affected, must act to depress demand, while 
the substantial rise in mortgage rates will 
reduce discretionary household income and 
spending. 
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The direct and indirect effects of the 
prolonged disruption in the coal industry 
are l ikely to reduce the annual ra te of 
growth of GDP th i s year by about 0.5%. The 
growth profile last year was such that, even 
if GDP during the remainder of 1984 remains 
almost unchanged from i t s f i r s t quarter 
l eve l , the year-on-year growth ra te wi l l 
s t i l l approach 2%, though the fourth quarter 
to fourth quarter ra te would be markedly 
lower. Resolution of the miners' dispute 
and a return to growth during the f inal 
quarter would be unlikely to bring the out-
tu rn to more than 2.5%, well shor t of 
official Treasury forecasts. 
The a t t a i n m e n t of a g rowth r a t e 
s ignif icant ly in excess of 2% t h i s year 
r e l i e s on fixed investment and exports 
f u l f i l l i ng in part the stimulatory role 
played by consumers' expendi tu re and 
stockbuilding during the earlier stages of 
expansion. I t appears t h a t a marked 
recovery in private fixed investment i s in 
fact taking place. The volume of industrial 
investment in the f i r s t half of t h i s year 
was 13% higher than in the corresponding 
period of 1983. For manufacturing the 
increase was even higher at 15%. However, 
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the recovery in investment occurred almost 
entirely in the f i r s t quarter with l i t t l e 
further growth during the second. 
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The increased contribution of investment 
to aggregate demand reflects a significant 
improvement in the f inancial surplus of 
the corporate sector and some rescheduling 
of projects in the l igh t of the Budget 
changes in the s t r u c t u r e of c a p i t a l 
allowances. The most recent DTI Investment 
Intentions Survey suggests a rise of 9% in 
the volume of fixed investment in the 
course of t h i s year . The fo r eca s t 
increase for manufacturing investment i s 
somewhat g r e a t e r , with i n t e n t i o n s 
p a r t i c u l a r l y s t r o n g in m e t a l s , 
engineering, vehicles and texti les. Even 
if the pred ic ted inc rease occurs , 
manufacturing investment wi l l s t i l l be 
about 30% below peak levels reached in 
1979. Allowing for the contraction in 
manufacturing since that date, i t would 
appear that investment in t h i s sector i s 
currently taking place a t a pace broadly 
similar to peak pre-recession levels. 
While fixed investment appears to be 
fu l f i l l i ng the role envisaged for i t in 
1984 forecasts, i t is difficult to say the 
same of exports. The volume of exports 
during the f i r s t half of the year was 
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1% up on that of the f inal quarter of 
1983, whi le the volume of imports 
increased by 3% over the same period. The 
c u r r e n t account su rp lus of 1983 was 
maintained during the f i rs t quarter of the 
current year but replaced by a substantial 
deficit during the second. 
The second quarter def ic i t stemmed from a 
marked deter iora t ion in the balance of 
visible trade, which swung from approximate 
balance in the final quarter of 1983 and the 
f i r s t quarter of 1984 into a def ic i t of 
£1.3bn during the second. The bulk (£800m) 
of the second quarter deficit was accounted 
for by a sharp fal l in the surplus on oil as 
d o m e s t i c s t o c k s were b u i l t up in 
ant ic ipat ion of further disruption in the 
Gulf and as imports of fuel o i l to power 
s ta t ions were increased to reduce reliance 
on coal during the miners' dispute. 
Nonetheless, the behaviour of the non-oil 
account during the second quarter was not 
p a r t i c u l a r l y encouraging. Even though 
s t e r l ing ' s effective exchange ra te was 4% 
lower in the f i r s t half of 1984 than in the 
l a t t e r half of 1983, the volume of non-oil 
exports has shown l i t t l e change since the 
f inal quarter of l a s t year. Exports to 
European countries f e l l marginally during 
the second quarter while those to developing 
countries continued the i r downward trend. 
Only exports to centrally planned economies 
recorded any marked increase. Though the 
volume of exports has shown l i t t l e further 
growth since the final quarter of last year, 
the level during the f i r s t half of this year 
was s t i l l some 6% above the average for 1983 
as a whole. 
Price inflation remained close to 5% during 
the f i r s t half of this year, before falling 
to 4.5% in July. Average earnings in the 
whole economy continue to increase at just 
under 8%, but at over 9% in manufacturing. 
Consequent real income gains for those in 
employment would therefore be considerable 
even in the absence of recovery in corporate 
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dividends and reductions in the real 
burden of t a x a t i o n . Since the vas t 
majority of the labour force f a l l into 
th i s category aggregate real personal 
disposable income th i s year i s l ike ly to 
increase by almost 3% on i t s 1983 level. 
Stable price inflation appears to bolster 
consumer confidence, which, coupled with 
the marked upward trend in disposable 
income, underpins the somewhat slower 
growth of consumers' expenditure now that 
the downward trend in the savings r a t io 
has been reversed , a t l e a s t for the 
present. The savings r a t i o rose to 9.2? 
during the f i r s t quarter compared to 8.3% 
in the corresponding period a year 
ea r l i e r . A resumption of the downward 
trend in the ratio would appear crucially 
dependent on i n f l a t i o n remaining a t 
present l e v e l s or f a l l i n g f u r t h e r . 
Historical data suggest that there i s 
scope for a permanent f a l l of 1.5 - 2% in 
the savings r a t i o from present levels if 
inflation were perceived to s t a b i l i s e a t 
5%. 
The off ic ia l ta rge t of 4.5% inf la t ion at 
the end of the year no longer seems 
a t ta inable . Though only the food and 
housing components of the Retail Price 
Index were increasing a t annual ra tes in 
excess of 4.5% over the twelve months to 
June, and while there i s some evidence of 
a deceleration in the rate of increase of 
food prices, in recent months, this will 
be more than offset by the effects of 
s t e r l ing ' s depreciation and the increases 
in in t e res t r a tes in July. I t i s unlikely 
however that the annual ra te wi l l exceed 
5.5% by the end of the year. The prospect 
of a continued reversal of the upward 
trend in interest rates will act to bring 
the inf la t ion ra te back towards official 
t a r g e t s during 1985, though t h e i r 
attainment i s by no means certain. 
A swift reduction in i n t e r e s t ra tes to 
l e v e l s compat ible with ac tua l and 
prospective inf la t ion i s v i t a l to the 
maintenance of the recovery, off ic ia l 
protes ta t ions notwithstanding. Present 
levels of real in te res t r a t e s , already 
h i s t o r i c a l l y high before the July 
increases, must act to depress activity in 
both the personal and corporate sectors . 
Rising in te res t ra tes not only reduce 
discretionary personal income as mortgage 
committments increase, but also make 
consumer credit, one of the foundations of 
the upturn to da t e , i nc reas ing ly 
unattractive. Though the personal sector 
i s in a g g r e g a t e a ne t l e n d e r , t h e 
redistribution of income within the sector 
wrought by r i s ing in te res t ra tes i s l ike ly 
to reduce the marginal propensity to consume 
by divert ing income from younger to older 
people. For the corporate sector, r i s ing 
real in te res t ra tes reduce the r a t e of 
return on investment projects , an effect 
which wil l be reinforced over time by the 
reduction in capital allowances. Repayment 
of corporate debt becomes an increasingly 
a t t r ac t i ve a l te rna t ive to investment in 
plant or inventories as interest rates r ise. 
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THE LABOUR MARKET 
EMPLOYMENT AND UNEMPLOYMENT 
The primary source of information on the 
numbers in work ( the "employed labour 
force") used to be the annual Census of 
Employment. However, the annual census fel l 
victim to one of the Rayner reviews and 
survives only in an emasculated t r i enn i a l 
form, the two most recent being in 1978 and 
1981. In the in terval between censuses 
official quarterly estimates of the numbers 
in work are based on monthly and quarterly 
surveys of employers, with subsequent 
revisions of the estimates when the results 
of the next Census of Employment or Labour 
Force Survey become available. 
When the preliminary resu l t s of the 1981 
Census of Employment were published in mid-
1983, i t was obvious that substantial upward 
revisions were required to the survey-based 
quarterly estimates for the period 1978-81. 
Jus t how substant ia l was not i n i t i a l l y 
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realised as the preliminary results of the 
Census themselves were extensively revised 
upwards in the l a t t e r half of 1983. An 
obvious question then presented i t se l f , 
namely what was to be done with the post 
1981 estimates of employment which, being 
survey-based, were obviously flawed ? The 
solution adopted was to assume that the 
quarterly underestimation of employment 
revealed over the period 1978-81 was s t i l l 
continuing and to make an appropriate 
cumulative adjustment to the survey based 
estimates each quarter. 
This rule of thumb did not meet with 
universal approval. The reason for the 
scepticism was straightforward: On the 
face of i t 1978-81 represented quite a 
different phase of the economic cycle than 
1981-83. The former included a period of 
rapid expansion to mid-1979, followed by a 
steep descent into recession. The la t ter , 
by contrast , was a period best described 
as bouncing along the bottom. I t was not 
at a l l obvious that the evolution of 
employment would be s imi la r in both 
periods. 
However, in the absence of further data 
independent commentators could do l i t t l e 
more than draw at tent ion to what they 
considered the somewhat dubious nature of 
the of f ic ia l est imates. Such additional 
data has j u s t become available from the 
1983 Labour Force Survey. The l a t e s t 
informat ion sugges ts t h a t the CSO 
estimates for the employed labour force in 
the period 1981-83, even with the 
controversial ad-hoc adjustment, were 
again too low! 
Quarterly est imates of employment since 
June 1981 have therefore had to be revised 
yet again to render them consistent with 
the Labour Force Survey r e su l t s . For 
quarters af ter June 1983 the CSO have 
decided that the published estimates will 
assume that the regular monthly surveys 
are continuing to underestimate numbers 
employed by the same margin as over the 
period 1981-83. The l a t e s t f i g u r e s 
compiled on t h i s basis suggest tha t the 
total number of people at work in Britain 
increased by 188,000 in the twelve months 
to l a s t March. The numbers registered as 
unemployed were broadly unchanged over the 
same period. 
The weak recovery in Bri ta in ' s t r ad i t iona l 
indus t r i a l sectors i s reflected in the 
changing pattern of employment. Given that 
non-oil industrial production in Britain is 
s t i l l more than 10% below i t s 1979 peak, i t 
i s not surprising tha t employment in th i s 
sector has continued to f a l l , with that in 
manufacturing down by 103,000 in the year to 
March. In the service sector, by contrast, 
employment increased by 335,000 over the 
same period. Most parts of the service 
sector recorded increases in employment, 
with par t icular ly large gains in retailing 
and wholesaling, banking and finance, and 
business services. By contrast most parts 
of manufacturing shed jobs, though there 
were exceptions, of which the most obvious 
were high tech indus t r ies . In addition 
however, employment also increased in some 
parts of mechanical engineering, metal goods 
and industries associated with construction. 
The increase in employment has occurred 
almost ent i re ly amongst women, who f i l l ed 
181,000 of the 188,000 net new jobs created 
in the twelve month period. The pattern 
which emerges i s therefore one in which new 
jobs are primarily in services and primarily 
for women. In addit ion, job creation has 
been overwhelmingly biassed towards par t -
time work, with the number of fu l l - t ime 
females in employment actually fa l l ing by 
31,000 in the year to March. Yet as far as 
the CSO estimates of t o t a l employment are 
concerned no d i s t inc t ion i s made between 
fu l l and part- t ime work. A continuing 
scepticism i s in order when an increase in 
employment of 188,000, announced with much 
fanfare, i s in r ea l i t y an increase of l ess 
than half that number in full-time jobs. 
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Given such sluggish growth in the number 
of fu l l - t ime jobs, coupled with a large 
pool of unregistered jobseekers, i t is not 
surprising that the numbers registered as 
unemployed have continued to creep 
upwards. The number of adults unemployed 
(excluding school-leavers) increased by 
almost 65,000 in the year to June. The 
increase was ent i re ly accounted for by 
increased female unemployment, the numbers 
of adult males registered fa l l ing by 
14,000 over the period. 
The number of vacancies increased 
marginally during the second quarter, but 
was s t i l l below the levels recorded at the 
end of 1983. About half of the additional 
vacancies n o t i f i e d during the second 
q u a r t e r were on o f f i c i a l employment 
creation schemes. However, even allowing 
for this , the monthly inflow of vacancies 
notified to jobcentres was marginally 
higher in the second quarter than during 
the f i r s t . The engagement r a t e of 
employees in manufacturing continued to 
increase during the second quarter and was 
acompanied by a slight fa l l in the rate of 
employee separations. 
INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS IN BRITAIN 
The miners' strike, whatever i t s outcome, 
wi l l have widespread effects for some 
time. I t i s l ike ly to dominate the TUC 
d e b a t e s in Sep tember , t o f i g u r e 
prominently in any assessment of the role 
of the law in industrial relations, and to 
shape future trends in labour law, police 
tactics and methods of union organisation 
in a national strike. I t seems likely also 
to be seen as a t e s t of union a l l iances : 
Indeed, one of the interesting features of 
the dispute thus far has been the limited 
assistance other unions have been able, or 
indeed willing, to give the miners. This 
i s in s t a r k c o n t r a s t to t r a d i t i o n a l 
statements of solidarity. 
The s t r ike has also been notable for the 
massive movement of pickets about the 
country. This has triggered s imilar 
police movements and the bringing into 
operation of sophisticated co-ordination 
arrangements across forces. Mass picketing 
has been characterised by violence and 
i n t i m i d a t i o n . Considering t h a t no 
e x i s t i n g mine r s a r e be ing made 
compulsorily redundant under the present 
proposals for the industry and tha t the 
voluntary redundancy terms on offer are 
better than those available to steel workers 
and o t h e r s , the l e v e l of v io lence and 
intimidation i s unexpected. One possible 
explanation i s that political grievances and 
aspirations appear to increasingly determine 
the NUM's conduct of the dispute. The 
aggressive action of the miners r e f l ec t s 
the i r strong disapproval of the s t r i c t 
market conditions under which government 
policy is being conducted, conditions long 
alien to their industry and which to many in 
i t seem inappropriate in conditions of high 
unemployment. 
Another unexpected feature of the strike has 
been i t s duration. In sp i te of l imited 
social security payments, there has been 
l i t t l e evidence of any large scale d r i f t 
back to work. In an unknown number of 
cases financial indebtedness may have proved 
l e s s unpa la t ab le than the prospect of 
violent int imation. While NUM funds and 
donat ions from o ther unions and l o c a l 
au thor i t i es have been used to support the 
strike, l i t t l e i s known about the extent of 
l o c a l h e l p o p e r a t i n g t h r o u g h food 
distribution centres etc. Equally l i t t l e i s 
known of the ex ten t of any increased 
indebtedness or associated declines in 
personal savings which may be occurring. 
At the individual level pressures to return 
to work cannot but i nc rease wi th the 
approach of winter. I t remains to be seen 
whether the counter pressures, both legal 
and i l l e g a l , of s t r i k i n g co l l eagues 
increases pari passu. 
But perhaps the most interesting feature of 
the strike to date has been the opportunity 
to t e s t the usefu lness of the recen t 
employment legislat ion. So far there has 
been l i t t l e attempt to invoke the civil law 
to deal with secondary picketing, although 
widespread successful use of the law and 
resul t ing f inancial pressures on the NUM 
might be expected to bring a rapid end to 
the s t r ike . The paradox remains that 
secondary picketing was outlawed in 1980, as 
a response to changes in union t a c t i c s and 
i n c r e a s e d use of f l y i n g p i c k e t s , 
consequently fa i lure to implement the law 
may only serve to bring i t into disrepute. 
But in s t ead of g r e a t e r use of the law 
rel iance seems now to be placed on the co-
ordinated movement of massive numbers of 
police. Whether containment i s preferable 
to enforcement of the law i s debatable. 
1?. 
Certainly i t must be accepted that the 
preferred strategy may be determined by 
p o l i t i c a l as much as by any other 
considerations. In addition, if the NCB 
takes out an in junc t ion aga ins t the 
Yorkshire area of the NUM, for example, 
but then fai ls to use i t , or only attempts 
to ac t iva te i t a t a much l a t e r date, the 
court may not be wil l ing to grant the 
request. I t may be fel t that the employer 
i s using the law at a time and under 
conditions that su i t s him, rather than 
s u i t s the c o u r t s . When considering 
a l te rna t ive s t ra teg ies in the dispute, 
greater use of the law has therefore to be 
considered with care. 
An i n d u s t r i a l r e l a t i o n s i s sue q u i t e 
distinct from the coal dispute but equally 
l ikely to have repurcussions in coming 
months and to be the subject of heated 
debate a t the TUC Congress i s the new 
style company agreement advocated by the 
e lec t r i c ians union (EEPTU). The new 
s ty le of agreement inc ludes employee 
consultation arrangements, arbitration as 
the f inal method of resolving d isputes , 
and sole negotiating r igh t s . The EEPTU 
has recently concluded an agreement of 
this kind with Hitachi at Hirwaun in South 
Wales. This i s only the most recent in a 
series which includes Toshiba at Plymouth, 
Sanyo at Lowestoft and Inmos at Newport. 
Perhaps a dozen of these agreements are 
now operating, many in the high technology 
sector of industry. 
The Toshiba agreement was the f i rs t to be 
struck and became effective from April 
1981. I t gives sole recognition and 
bargaining rights to EETPU, all employees 
enjoy s t a f f condi t ions of employment 
normally associated with monthly paid 
staff and the company agrees to promote 
membership of the union and participation 
in i t s a f fa i rs with union dues being 
collected through a check-off system. 
Separate d i s c i p l i n a r y and grievance 
procedures and complete f l ex ib i l i t y of 
labour within and among departments are 
provided for. All i s s u e s a f fec t ing 
e m p l o y e e s a r e n e g o t i a t e d in a 
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e A d v i s o r y B o a r d . 
Disagreements are deal t with under a 
three-stage procedure, the l a s t stage of 
which is a binding pendulum arb i t ra t ion 
system. Here, an arbitrator accepted by 
both par t ies i s required to find in 
favour of either the company or the union: 
A compromise s o l u t i o n cannot be 
recommended. 
These agreements generally do not contain a 
specific commitment to reject the use of the 
s t r ike weapon. Only in a few cases, such 
as the Hi tach i agreement, i s the re a 
commitment to resolve disputes without the 
use of any form of indus t r ia l action. I t 
i s th i s type of agreement that poses the 
greatest concern to other unions and which 
is likely to be the subject of heated debate 
a t the TUC Congress. The a t t r ac t ion of 
these types of agreements, at leas t to 
EETPU, i s the numbers that can be enrolled 
in membership. But since only the EEPTU is 
subsequently recognised by management, 
employees who are members of other unions 
see no benefit in retaining that membership. 
A number of unions in the plants concerned 
have therefore objected strongly to the 
EETPU strategy. The electricians union has 
argued that in many cases i t i s a question 
of making an agreement of th i s kind or no 
agreement a t a l l . The counter-argument 
proferred by other unions i s tha t the same 
ends could l a r g e l y be achieved using 
existing agreements which operate a cooling-
off p e r i o d when c o n c i l i a t i o n and 
arbitration fai l to solve a dispute. They 
argue that agreements of t h i s type are 
preferable to the v i r tua l reject ion of the 
s t r ike weapon. In addition, trade unions 
are wary of employers playing off one union 
a g a i n s t a n o t h e r to ge t EETPU-type 
agreements. 
Faced with fa l l ing union membership, a 
changing occupational structure and a tight 
legal environment, trade unions wi l l be 
forced to c l a r i f y t h e i r a t t i t u d e to 
col lect ive agreements of the EETPU type. 
At the very l e a s t i t may encourage 
exploration of alternatives. 
Another issue l ike ly to loom large in the 
TUC debates in September, and in the annual 
negotiations on pay and conditions in the 
autumn, i s the claim for a 35 hour week. 
Cuts in working hours were recently endorsed 
by the EEC provided they could be achieved 
without a r ise in unit costs. Despite the 
British government's failure to endorse the 
idea, i t i s s t i l l likely to be a significant 
influence in negotiations in the autumn. 
The Engineering Employers' Federation are 
currently studying the Confederation of 
Shipbuilding and Engineering Union's claim 
for a 35 hour week as part of a general 
revision of the national agreement covering 
the engineering industry. I t i s possible 
that some cut in hours will be agreed. The 
idea has received continuing support from 
the TUC, which has operated a Campaign for 
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Reduced Working Time for a considerable 
period. The TUC argue that a number of 
European countries have made significant 
progress towards the goal of a 35 hour 
week and 6 weeks basic holidays with the 
largest reductions in hours being achieved 
in t h e s e c o u n t r i e s w i t h t h e b e s t 
productivity records. 
Although the 40 hour week has been 
breached, l i t t l e real progress has been 
made in the UK. British hours of work are 
s t i l l generally in excess of those in 
Europe while holidays remain infer ior . 
Thus normal weekly hours of work (those 
for which bas ic r a t e s of pay are 
applicable) have fallen slowly in recent 
years and in December 1983 s t i l l amounted 
to 39.2 hours, with average basic holidays 
standing a t approximately 21 days per 
annum; though actual holidays are often 
bet ter than the minimum laid down by 
agreements. The persistence of overtime 
working in Bri tain i s ci ted by the TUC in 
support of thei r case. In early 1984 
approximately one third of operatives in 
Br i t i sh manufacturing were on average 
working 8.7 hours overtime per week. 
But the main spur to British claims for a 
reduced working week wi l l be the recent 
successful para l le l claim of the German 
engineering union I G Metall. After a 
seven week strike, in which perhaps half a 
million workers were involved and car 
p r o d u c t i o n t h r o u g h o u t Europe was 
disrupted, I G Metall se t t l ed for a 38.5 
hour basic working week from April 1985, 
with variations to be negotiated at plant 
level for different grades of workers, 
This arrangement applies a t leas t un t i l 
October 1986. The f a l l in hours i s 
expected to raise unit costs by about 8%. 
The reduction in hours secured represents 
significantly less than total victory for 
the European t rade union campaign 
advocating a cut in hours as a means of 
creating jobs. In fact , i t has produced 
a resu l t largely in l ine with the long 
term change in working hours occurring in 
Germany over the last 30 years. Over the 
14 years, 1955-1969, working hours in West 
Germany fe l l by 5 hours per week to 44; 
and from 1969-1985 they are now set to 
f a l l by 5.5 hours. Bri t ish negotiators 
are l ikely to be fully aware of these 
changes when they negotiate new agreements 
in the autumn. 
PROGNOSIS 
The recovery in the British economy faltered 
during the f i r s t half of th i s year. The 
disruption wrought by the miners' dispute, 
while only pa r t i a l l y responsible for the 
slowdown, i s l ike ly to exert continuing 
dampening e f f e c t s , both d i r e c t and 
indi rec t , on ac t iv i ty during the remainder 
of this year. The direct effects will be in 
proportion to the duration of the dispute, 
the indirect a ref lect ion of i t s impact on 
the government's economic s t rategy. The 
i n d i r e c t channels of t r ansmis s ion are 
i n t e r e s t r a t e s , consumer p r i c e s , the 
exchange ra te and the PSBR. All have been 
adversely affected to some degree by the 
dispute. 
The sharp, but short-lived, rise in interest 
r a tes in July, coupled with the stagnation 
of the f i r s t two quarters shows j u s t how 
fragile the recovery remains, even though i t 
is now in i t s third year. Neither domestic 
conditions in product and money markets, 
i n f l a t i o n a r y expecta t ions nor the PSBR 
figures j u s t i f i ed the July increase in 
ra tes . While the associated weakness of 
sterling will provide some mild stimulus to 
e x p o r t s , t h e i n f l a t i o n a r y e f f e c t s , 
p a r t i c u l a r l y t h r o u g h mor tgage r a t e 
increases, may more than offset t h i s by 
making i t d i f f i cu l t to maintain even the 
slight downward pressure on wage settlements 
experienced to date. 
The miners' dispute cannot wholly account 
for the slowdown during the f i r s t half of 
the year. The other contributory factor i s 
the failure of other components of demand to 
compensate for the weakness of consumers' 
spending and stockbuilding. While there has 
been a recovery in investment, the same i s 
not true of the trade balance. Export 
volume has been p r a c t i c a l l y s t agnan t , 
imports have continued to grow. 
I t i s d i f f i cu l t to identify a plausible 
macroeconomic response which would regain 
the momentum of recovery. A stimulus to 
domestic demand i s not required - the 
exper ience of the l a s t t h r e e years 
demonstrates t h a t such a measure a c t s 
primarily as a stimulus to Britain's trading 
partners. 
I t i s however much e a s i e r to i d e n t i f y 
appropriate microeconomic measures. Two in 
par t icular deserve mention. F i r s t , there 
must not be another government r e t r e a t on 
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the rationalisation of the coal industry. 
The adverse implications of such a retreat 
for other indust r ies in secular decline, 
and for the future conduct of industrial 
r e l a t i o n s in B r i t a i n , would be 
considerable. No society can long satisfy 
the material aspirations of i t s members if 
resources continue to be devoted to un-
economic operations. What government can 
do i s to smooth the path for the required 
real locat ion of resources. In concrete 
terms th i s requires measures to secure 
a l te rna t ive employment opportunit ies in 
mining communities. 
The achievement of th i s goal would be 
f a c i l i t a t e d by the second s e t of 
microeconomic measures, which would also 
have broader effects across the whole 
labour market. The required measures in 
this case are those which reduce the price 
of labour r e l a t i v e to c a p i t a l . The 
government has taken some tentative steps 
along th i s path. They should go much 
further. Appropriate policies include the 
promotion of greater wage f l e x i b i l i t y , 
reduc t ion of r e s t r i c t i v e p r a c t i c e s , 
r e d u c t i o n s in c a p i t a l i n v e s t m e n t 
incentives and increases in incentives to 
h i r e l a b o u r . C u r r e n t l e v e l s of 
unemployment require such measures as a 
matter of urgency. 
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